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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms 
(bankers on board, family-owned company, CEO duality, board size, and board 
composition), including control variables (firm size, firm age and firm‟s 
profitability) with capital structure (debt-equity ratio) of listed companies in 
Malaysia. This study uses data from 60 largest listed companies, based on their 
market capitalization, from all sectors in Malaysia except financial institution and 
insurance companies. The time period covered is from 2000 to 2004, that is,  after 
the announcement of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in 2000. This 
study finds positive relationships between capital structure and bankers on board, 
family-owned company, board composition, and firm size. The relationships on 
family-owned company and firm size are significant, with both have strongly 
influencing  the firms‟ capital structure. Profitability has a negative relationship. 
Board size and firm age both have negative, but significant relationships with the 
firms‟ capital structure. Generally, the existing literature on the relationships 
between corporate governance and capital structure has supported the findings of this 
study. 
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                                                     CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
Capital structure is how a corporation finances its assets with a mix of short-term 
debt, long-term debt, equity, or a mix of securities. In other words, it is how a firm 
develops a strategy in financing its growth and operation using different sources of 
financing. 
 
Researchers have placed great concern on capital structure as one of the most 
important issues in corporate finance (see for example, Hasan & Butt (2009); Huang 
& Song (2006) and Saad (2010)). This concern arises due to the fact that the mix of 
financing sources, cost and availability of capital affects the decision making for the 
companies (Omet & Mashharawe, 2002). While considering investment strategy in 
the company, a basic understanding about the capital structure is necessary, 
particularly its level of gearing and a originating point to arrive at a conclusion. 
 
There are a number of theories that have been forwarded to clarify the variation in 
capital structure for companies. Most of the theories argue that companies choose 
capital structure because they can verify better the costs and benefits pertaining to 
financial and equity financing of company, starting with capital structure irrelevance 
hypothesis as explained by  Modigliani and Miller (1958), followed by financial 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
 70 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abor, J. (2007). Corporate governance and financing decisions of Ghanaian listed 
firms. Corporate Governance, 7(1), 83–92.  
Abor, J., & Fiador, V. (2013). Does corporate governance explain dividend policy in 
Sub-Saharian Africa?: International Journal of Law and Management, 55(3), 
201–225. 
Adams, R., & Mehran, H. (2003). Is corporate governance different for bank holding 
companies? Economic Policy Review, (9), 123-142. 
Ahmed, N., Ahmed, Z., & Ahmed, I. (2010). Determinants of capital structure: A 
case of life insurance sector of Pakistan. European Journal of Economics, 
Finance and Administrative Sciences, 24(24). 
Alias, N., Rahim, R. A., Nor, F. M., & Yaacob, M. H. (2014). Board structure, 
capital structure and dividend per share: Is there interaction effect? Indian 
Journal of Corporate Governance, 2–14. 
Ampenberger, M., Achleitner, A., & Kaserer, C. (2011). Capital structure decisions 
in family firms - Empirical evidence from a bank-based economy. Review of 
Managerial Science, (7),247-275. 
Amran, N. A. (2011). Corporate governance mechanisms and company performance: 
evidence from Malaysian companies.International Review of International 
Research Paper, 7(6), 101–114. 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board characteristics, 
accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 37(3), 315–342. 
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm 
performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. American Finance Association, 58 
(3), 1301–1328. 
Andres, C. (2008). Large shareholders and firm performance-An empirical 
examination of founding-family ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 
431–445.  
Antoniou, A., & Paudyal, K. (2002). Determinants of corporate capital structure: 
Evidence from European countries, Working Paper, Universiti of Durham 
 71 
 
Arping, S., & Sautner, Z. (2010). Corporate governance and leverage: Evidence from 
a natural experiment. Finance Research Letters, 7(2), 127–134.  
Baral, K. J. (2004). Determinants of capital structure: A case study of listed 
companies of Nepal. The Journal of Nepalese Business Studies, I(1), 1–13. 
Berger, A. N., Udell, G. F., Acs, Z., Berlin, M., Bonaccorsi, E., Bonime, Wolken, J. 
(1998). The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity 
and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 22, 1–69. 
Berle, Adolph, & Means, G. (1932). The Moden and Private Property. United States: 
Transaction Publisher. 
Bevan, A. A., & Danbolt, J. (2002). Capital structure and its determinants in the UK 
- A decompositional analysis. Applied Financial Economics, 12, 159–170. 
Bodaghi, A., & Ahmadpour, A. (2010). The effect of corporate governance and 
ownership structure on capital structure of Iranian listed companies, (7
TH
 
ICESAL 2010) 28-29 June 2010, Rhodes Island Greece. 
Bokpin, G. a., & Arko, A. C. (2009). Ownership structure, corporate governance and 
capital structure decisions of firms: Empirical evidence from Ghana. Studies in 
Economics and Finance, 26(4), 246–256. 
Boone, A. L., Casares Field, L., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007). The 
determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 85(1), 66–101. 
Booth, J. R., & Deli, D. N. (1999). On executives of financial institutions as outside 
directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(3), 227–250. 
Borokhovich, K. A. (2004). Board composition and corporate use of interest rate 
derivatives. The Journal of Financial Research, XXVII(2), 199–216. 
Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. 
Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), 301-312. 
Brailsford, T. J., Oliver, B. R., & Pua, S. L. H. (2002). On the relation between 
ownership structure and capital structure. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 
42, 1–26. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., Jarrell, G., Chapman, D., Coles, J., Denis, Zirnmer, J. 
(1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(January 1994), 189–220. 
 72 
 
Burak Güner, a., Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Financial expertise of directors. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 88(2), 323–354. 
Burkart, M., & Shleifer, A. (2002). Family firms, Harvard University, Cambrige, 
MA. 
Byrd, D. T., & Mizruchi, M. S. (2005). Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of 
firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1-2), 129–173. 
Cadbury, A. (1992). The financial aspects of corporate governance, Report ,1–90. 
Castanias, R. (1983). Bankruptcy risk and optimal capital structure. Journal of 
Finance, XXXVIII(5), 1617–1636. 
Cau, G., & Stacchini, M. (2010). The certification role of bank directors on corporate 
boards, MOFIR Working Paper. 1–30. 
Chen, C., Lin, J. B., & Yi, B. (2008). CEO duality and firm performance - An 
endogenous issue. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(1). 
Chen, Z., Cheung, Y.-L., Stouraitis, A., & Wong, A. W. S. (2005). Ownership 
concentration, firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong. Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 13(4), 431–449. 
Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., & Yoo, S. S. (2009). The value of outside directors: 
Evidence from corporate governance reform in Korea. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 42(04), 941.  
Ciamarra, E. S. (2006). Monitoring by affiliated bankers on board of directors: 
Evidence from corporate financing outcomes, Working Paper Series.   
Claessens, S., & Djankov, S. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment 
effects of large shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Colin, L. (2000). Corporate performance in the East 
Asian financial crisis, Vol. 15, 23–46. 
Coles, J., Daniel, N., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.  
Cosh, & Hughe. (2009). Size, financial structure and profitability: UK companies in 
the 1980s. In Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development in Post-
Socialist Economies 163–189. 
 73 
 
Dittmann, I., Maug, E., & Schneider, C. (2009). Bankers on the boards of German 
firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there Bankers 
on the Boards of German Firms, Review of Finance(pp. 1–45).  
Dobrica, F. I. (2007). UK and US multinational corporations capital structure: 
Different approaches to shareholder value maximization, Analele Stinfice ale 
Universitatii, 54, 126-132  
Drakos, a. a., & Bekiris, F. V. (2010). Corporate performance, managerial ownership 
and endogeneity: A simultaneous equations analysis for the Athens stock 
exchange. Research in International Business and Finance, 24(1), 24–38.  
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European. 
Journal of Finacial Economics, 65, 365–395. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 88 (2), 288–307. 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal 
of Law and Economics, XXVI 
Feidakis, A., & Rovolis, A. (2007). Capital structure choice in European Union: 
Evidence from the construction industry1. Applied Financial Economics, 
17(12), 989–1002.  
Ferry, K. (2007). Board of directors study in Australia and New Zealand. 
International & Eagan Associates, 0–28. 
Fosberg, R. H. (2004). Agency problems and debt financing: leadership structure 
effects. Corporate governance : The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 4(1), 31–38.  
Friend, I., & Lang, L. H. P. (1988). An empirical test of the impact of managerial 
self-interest on corporate capital structure. Journal of Finance, 43(2), 271–282. 
Ganiyu, Y. O., & Abiodun, B. Y. (2012). The impact of corporate governance on 
capital structure decision of Nigerian firms. Research Journal in Organizational 
Psychology & Educational Studies, 1(2), 121–128. 
Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. F. (2005). On REIT CEO compensation: Does board 
structure matter? The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 30(4), 
397–428.  
Gill, A., Biger, N., Mand, H. S., & Shah, C. (2012). Corporate governance and 
capital structure of small business service firms in India. International Journal 
of Economics and Finance, 4(8), 83–92.  
 74 
 
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., & Ofer, A. R. (2001). Taxes and capital structure: Evidence 
from firms response to the tax reform act of 1986. Review Financial Studies, 
5(2), 331–355. 
Glen, J., Pinto, B., Edisis, W., Griffin, C. C., & Marsden, K. (1994). Debt or equity? 
How firms in developing countries choose. Discussion Paper 22. 
Gregory, B. T., Rutherford, M. W., Oswald, S., & Gardiner, L. (2005). An empirical 
investigation of the growth cycle theory of small firm financing. Journal of 
Small Business Management, 43(4), 382–392.  
Guest, P. (2008). The determinants of board size and composition: Evidence from 
the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(44), 51–72. 
Guner, A. B., Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). The impact of boards with 
financial expertise on corporate policies. National Bureau of Academic 
Research. 
Hall, G., Hutchinson, P., & Michaelas, N. (2010). Industry effects on the 
determinants of unquoted SMEs‟ capital structure. International Journal of the 
Economics of Business, 7(3), 297–312.  
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance 
of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
33(7-8), 1034–1062. 
Hasan, A., & Butt, S. A. (2009). Impact of ownership structure and corporate 
governance on capital structure of Pakistani listed companies. International 
Journal of Business and Management, 4(2), 50–57.  
Heidrick, & Struggles. (2007). Annual corporate board effectiveness study.  
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review, 7–26. 
Hillman, A. J., Canella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The resource dependence 
role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in 
response to environmental change. Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 235-
255. 
Huang, S. G. H., & Song, F. M. (2006). The determinants of capital structure: 
Eevidence from China, China Economic Review 17, 14-35. 
 75 
 
Ibrahim, H. (2011). Corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public-
listed family-ownership in Malaysia. International Journal of Economics 
Finance, 3(1), 105–115. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 4(3), 
305–360. 
Khoo, B. Y. (2003). Review of corporate governance in Asia corporate governance 
in Malaysia. 
Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (2002). Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of 
interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics, 62(2), 415–452. 
Lawler, E. E., & Conger, J. A. (2009). Effective organizations sharing leadership on 
corporate boards: A critical requirement for teamwork. Organization Dynamics, 
38(3), 183-191. 
Levrau, A., & Berghe, L. A. A. Van Den. (2007). Corporate governance and board 
effectiveness: Beyond formalism. VI(4), 58–86.  
Liew, P. K. (2008). The (perceived) roles of corporate governance reforms in 
Malaysia. Research in Accounting in Emerging Economy, (8), 455-482. 
Linck, J., Netter, J., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 87(2), 308–328.  
López-gracia, J., & Sánchez-andújar, S. (2007). Financial structure of the family 
business: Evidence from a group of small Spanish firms. Family Business 
Review, XX(4), 269–288. 
Mansi, S. A., & Agca, S. (2008). Managerial ownership , takeover defenses, and debt 
financing. The Journal of Financial Research, XXXI(2), 85–112. 
Matos, J. A. de, Ferreira, M., Matos, P., & Mergulhao, J. (2010). The network 
centrality of influential bankers: A new capital structure determinant, Working 
Paper. 
Matos, J. Amaro de, & Mergulhao, J. (2011). The network centrality of influential 
bankers:A new capital structure determinant, Working Paper,1–26. 
Mazur, K. (2007). The determinants of capital structure choice: Evidence from 
Polish companies. International Advances in Economic Research, 13(4), 495–
514.  
 76 
 
Mcconaughy, D. L. (2008). The cost of capital for the closely-held, family-controlled 
firm, USASBE proceedings  113–128. 
Miller, D., & Breton-Miller, I. Le. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: 
Agency, stewardship, and capabilities. Family Firm Institute, XIX(1). 
Mitchell, K., & Walker, M. D. (2008). Bankers on boards, financial constraint , and 
financial distress. Working Paper Series 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and 
the theory of investment. The American Economic Review  
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1963a). American economic association corporate 
income taxes and the cost of capital: A Correction, 53(3), 433–443. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1963b). Corporate income taxes and the cost of 
capital: A correction. American Economic Review, 53(3), 433–443. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W., Deardorff, A., Fox, M., Froot, Terrell, K. (2000). The 
information content of stock markets: Why do emerging markets have 
synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial Economics, (58), 1-
2. 
Myers, S. C. (1984). Capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575-592.   
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital Structure, Journal of Economic Perspective, 15(2), 81–
102. 
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), 187–221.  
Nazir, M. S. (2012). The impact of CEO duality on capital structure: A case from 
non-financial sector of Pakistan. American Journal of Scientific Research, 
56(56), 5–12. 
Omet, G., & Mashharawe, F. (2002). The capital structure choice in tax contrasting 
environment: Evidence from the Jordanian, Kuwaiti, Omani and Saudi 
corporate sectors. Paper Presented at the Econ. Res. Forum 10th Ann. 
Conference. December (Marrakesh, Morocco)., 1–24. 
Peng, M. W. (2001). Interlocking directorates as corporate governance in third world 
multinationals: Theory and evidence from Thailand, Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 18 (2), 161–181. 
 77 
 
Peng, M. W., Li, Y., Xie, E., & Su, Z. (2009). CEO duality, organizational slack, and 
firm performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4), 611–
624.  
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The 
organization and its environment Administritive Science Quaterly , 218–229. 
Poutziouris, P. Z. (2001). The views of family companies on venture capital: 
Empirical evidence from the UK small to medium-size enterprising economy. 
Family Business Review, 14(3), 277–291.  
Poorzamani, Z., & Khademi, S. (2014). The effect of corporate governance factors 
on cash flow resulting from operating activities and firm financing. Indian 
Journal of Fundamental and Applied Life Sciences, 4, 1629–1638. 
 
Rahman, R. A., & Ali, F. H. M. (2006). Board, audit committee, culture and earnings 
management: Malaysian evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7), 783–
804.  
 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, L(50). 
Romano, C. A., & Tanewski, G. A. (2000). Capital structure decision making: A 
model for family business. Journal of Business Venturing, 9026(99), 285–310. 
Saad, N. M. (2010). Corporate governance compliance and the effects to capital 
structure in Malaysia, (Note 2). International Journal of Economic and 
Finance, 2(1), 105–114. 
Serrasqueiro, Z., Nunes, P. M., & Vidigal, J. (2011). Are capital structure decisions 
of family-owned smes different? Empirical evidence from Portugal, CEFAGE-
UE Working Paper (pp. 1–39). 
Setia-Atmaja, L., Tanewski, G. a., & Skully, M. (2009). The role of dividends, debt 
and board structure in the governance of family controlled firms. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 36(7-8), 863–898. 
Shah, A., & Khan, S. (2007). Determinants of capital structure: Evidence from 
Pakistani panel data. International Review of Business Research Papers, 3(4), 
265–282. 
Shuto, A. (2010). The effect of managerial ownership on the cost of debt: Evidence 
from Japan. Discussion Paper Series, RIEB, Kobe University. 
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankove, G. F. (1999). Corporate distress in East Asia. 
World Bank report. 
 78 
 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The 
Journal of Finance, 43(1), 1-19. 
Trezevant, R. (1992). Debt financing and tax status: Tests of the substitution effect 
and the tax exhaustion hypothesis using firms‟ responses to the economic 
recovery tax act of 1981. Journal of Finance, (47), 1557–1569. 
Uwuigbe, U. (2014). Corporate governance and capital structure: Evidence from 
listed firms in Nigeria stock exchange. Journal of Accounting and Management, 
4(1), 5–14. 
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and 
management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–
417.  
Wang, Z.-J., & Deng, X.-L. (2006). Corporate governance and financial distress: 
Evidence from Chinese listed companies. Chinese Economy, 39(5), 5–27.  
Weisbach, M. I. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20, 431–460. 
Wellalage, N. H., & Locke, S. (2012). Corporate governance and capital structure 
decision of Sri Lankan listed firms. Global Review of Business and Economic 
Research, 8, 157-169 
Wen, Y., Rwegasira, K., & Bilderbeek, J. (2002). Corporate governance and capital 
structure decisions of the Chinese listed firms. Corporate Governance, 10(2), 
75–83.  
Williamson, O. E. (1984). Corporate Governance. Yale Law Journal. 
Yermack, D. L., Ofek, E., & Berger, P. G. (1997). Managerial entrenchment, and 
capital structure decisions. The Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1411–1439. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
